I originally published this short series of posts here in the summer of 2011. Like Accessing the 21st Century (Part 2, Part 3), my “infowarblog” was a prequel to the research I later did on security and systems, leading appropriately enough to a theory of systems securitization. A lot of the ideas I put into Securitizing Systems were already starting to come together in this series.
Infowar & Public Discourse is a four-part series that features a fairly cursory exploration of information warfare techniques and discourse, some folksy oversimplification care of Thomas Friedman (the always enjoyable to read patron saint of folksy oversimplification), and a bit of media theory for good measure.
Like always, you can follow me on Twitter @marklxndr for site updates and snark.
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(continued from Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3)Infowar and Public Discourse
Marshall McLuhan’s 100th birthday today (July 21) calls for the introduction of one of his typically esoteric phrases from Understanding Media: “The electric techniques [of war] cannot be used aggressively except to end all life at once, like the turning off of a light” (295). The phrase returns to the concept of opposing “hot weapons”, which have targets and permanent effects, with “cool” ones, which simply exist to be interacted with. Simply put, the above phrase means electronic technology cannot be used to cause permanent physical damage because it does not operate within the physical realm; but what about the conspicuous prepositional phrase “to end all life at once”? For the purpose of this analysis, consider that in his typical dramatic fashion, McLuhan is exaggerating here. Electronic technology does not “end” life—end, as in extinguish—but it (like all technologies) immediately and irreversibly changes the reality of modern societies: the end of societies as they were in so far as they can never return to what they were before that technology existed. The new reality of a world of cyberattacks, cybercrimes, cyberterrorism, information warfare, and any number of related activities is the gestalt effect of all of them; the difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate traffic and cyberattacks, the near-impossible task of defense against cyberattacks, and the resulting climate of uncertainty and fear all lead towards a new tension between governments and the governed.
It is not difficult to ascertain that the public discourse on information warfare is anemic, and this is for several reasons. While computer literacy in developed countries is significant, the necessary hackers’ intimacy with the inner workings of software and hardware is not prevalent; the vast majority of internet users (users, and therefore targets) are not experts and have little understanding of the mechanics of a cyberattack. This is compounded by the fact that public policy makers largely fall into this category of casual users who are aware of the possibility of a threat but who have no idea what form that threat may take or how to protect themselves against it (Western politicians have proven themselves time and time again to be somewhat technically inept, and this makes it difficult to make informed decisions on information issues). Unfortunately there is currently no data on internet usage statistics or proficiency for American or Canadian policy makers, but it is not hard to find archived news footage of top decision makers from either country that would support the hypothesis that, as a group, they are not to be readily considered experts.
Unfortunately, one of the more popular responses to the information warfare threat is the monitoring and censorship of online media. This is unfortunate because of the message it sends to the law-abiding public, which understands that information warfare is a threat, but does not particularly understand why or how, only that they should be frightened. The mass invasion of privacy by their own government is similarly unnerving to citizens of otherwise free countries, and this produces a unique twin-fear; fear of other governments and fear of one’s own government.
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to defend against cyberattacks on any scale. For reasons discussed in previous posts, retaliation for cyberattacks is extremely difficult; as such, the focus has shifted to active prevention. However, because it is extremely easy for any individual with cheap hardware and sufficient talent to launch a cyberattack, private citizens are obvious and necessary targets of any deterrence/prevention campaign. The result of this is the unfortunate reality that governments increasingly feel the need to infringe on the rights of private citizens—surveillance and data tracking and retention are two relatively common practices that threaten the privacy of internet users.
This increasingly asymmetrical relationship between governments and governed is also evident in other roles—buyer and seller, for example, when it comes to online shopping and the inherent uncertainty of giving up credit card information for unseen goods. In either case, uncertainty or uneasiness is a dominant presence. This new public tension is a distinct feature of the information age, and it has helped to shape the current discourse between governments and other governments, between governments and the governed, and between individuals.
